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Abstract 
 
After recent corporate scandals and financial crises, there has been a lot of discussion 
whether there should be more female representatives in top management and company 
boardrooms.  The movement of women into management, including upper levels of 
management, has been an important research topic for many years. 
The study contributes to the empirical literature by examining the relationship between 
board gender diversity and financial performance of banking sector in Georgia, a country 
which historically has a very masculine culture. It has been found that presence of just one 
woman on board has a negative and significant impact on the performance of banks. 
However, if there are two or more women on board the impact becomes positive and 
significant, which means gender diversity matters.  This research gives new light on 
Georgia’s boardroom dynamics, because it is the first to analyze Georgian reality and will 
contribute to the discussion about gender quotas, which has already started in politics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The effective and successful work of a board of directors depends upon various 
factors, such as qualification and experience of each member of the board, their level of 
share ownership in the firm, their cultural background and among these factors is also the 
gender composition of a boardroom. Recent corporate scandals and financial crises drew 
much more attention to corporate boards and their composition. For example, after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers a lot of questions were raised by investors about the role 
and actions of the board of directors who are responsible for protecting shareholders’ 
interests.
1
  
One of the main motivations of the study is the current situation in terms of gender 
equality and to understand if there are financial benefits of gender diversity for a firm.  
Gender inequality is not only a moral and social issue but is also a critical economic 
challenge. Women account for half of the world’s population and if their full economic 
potential is not achieved the global economy will suffer. Recent McKinsey Global 
Institute’s report “The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 
Trillion to Global Growth” shows that narrowing the global gender gap in work could 
double the contribution of women to global GDP growth between 2014 and 2025. If all 
countries used their full potential in the progress of gender parity, that would mean women 
playing an identical role in labor markets as men and it is estimated  that as much as $28 
trillion could be added to annual global GDP in 2025 which is practically almost the size of 
the combined US and Chinese economies today. In the case of just a “best in region” rate of 
progress, meaning that countries would match their performance in terms of gender 
equality with the best performer in their region, still $12 trillion would be added which is 
also equivalent in size to the current GDP of Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom all 
together.
2
 However, to reach these results it is crucial for countries and their societies to 
                                                          
1
 http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/where_was_lehma.html 
2
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/growth/how_advancing_womens_equality_can_add_12_trillion_to_globa
l_growth 
2 
 
understand the importance of solving the gender gap at work. More broadly, businesses 
need to think about how they access different skill sets. Business growth is much depending 
on the diversity of opinion, which means thinking and acting differently from the 
competitors. Gender diversity can be the one of the ways; women need to be proportionally 
represented in all sectors of the economy and to have the same possibilities as men have.  
Correspondingly, they need to be promoted to the senior management positions and in 
corporate boards of companies. This study will be one of the contributions for Georgian 
society to understand the need for gender diversity in corporate boards and encourage 
discussion about gender parity in the economy.   
Although universally recognized norms and principles of international law state that 
every human being has an equal right to employment regardless of sex and despite 
significant improvements in education and political participation, representation of women 
in decision making positions is still a challenge to the whole world, including Georgia. 
There is a lack of female representation in most of the decision-making positions whether it 
is politics or business. This is especially the case in Georgia because it is still a very 
masculine, patriarchal country where men occupy a dominant position.  
However, if we look back to the recent history we will see that women were widely 
promoted in management during the Soviet Union times due to the Communist ideal of 
equality of opportunity. The consequence was that females were not only represented in 
those traditional industries such as healthcare and hospitality but they were well accepted in 
other service industries such as financial services and technology.
3
 On the other hand, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of transition from planned economy to the 
market economy was really painful for the country. The process of privatization created a 
big gap between the rich and poor layers in the society. Moreover, political instability of 
the new government led to huge unemployment in the early 1990s. Notably women were 
significantly affected due to the collapse of all the traditional women’s fields such as food 
industry, textile, chemical production, etc.  Even though they tried to adapt to the new 
market standards most of them were unable to find employment according to their 
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qualifications and this situation forced them to move outside of the country as migrant 
workers. Most of them have been working in the Western countries as nannies and 
caretakers in order to help their families to survive (Kiria Lela, 2014). 
A lot of improvements have been made however in gender equality over the past 
two decades. Since Georgia is following European values government tries a lot to adjust 
national laws and regulations according the recommendations of different European 
governing bodies. In March 2010, the Government of Georgia adopted the law “On Gender 
Equality” and developed a National Action Plan. It underlines equal rights of men and 
women and points out the importance of active participation of women in political, 
economic and social processes. However, in terms of female representatives in the 
parliament Georgia only takes a 109th place out of 145 countries with a ratio of 12% 
according to the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women), which indicates that women’s role in parliament is minimal from 
150 seats only 18 are occupied by women. The same picture is observed for the executive 
body and these figures are quite law in comparison to Europe or the vast number of other 
countries around the globe.
4
 Moreover, according to the 2014 data from GEOSTAT, 62 
percent of businesses are headed by males and only 32 percent by females. Furthermore, on 
average the nominal monthly salary of employed men is 45.1 percent higher than that of 
employed women for past 16 years (1999-2014).
5
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Figure 1 - Average nominal monthly salary according to the gender in Georgian 
Lari(GEL) 
Source: National Statistic Office of Georgia - Women and Men in Georgia, 2015 
This is not only the developing countries’ dilemma. In its most recent attempt to 
promote gender equality in boardrooms, the European Union developed a proposal in 2012 
and adopted mandatory corporate board quotas for women. This legislation seeks to ensure 
that for 2020 there would be 40% of women on the boards of listed companies in Europe.
6
 
On the examples of Norway, Iceland and Spain, after the introduction of quotas the number 
of women in the top positions has risen. In general, European policy initiatives had a 
positive effect on gender diversity on corporate boards, with 19% of European boards 
having 30% or more female directors,  only 10%, having zero female representation, and 
over 50% of European companies possessing more than 20% of women on their boards 
(The CS Gender 3000: Women in Senior Management). However, the introduction of 
quotas has been a subject of deep discussions in some countries such as Great Britain, 
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Czech Republic and others. It has often been seen as unwelcome instructions to free 
business practices. 
Table 1 - Percentage of women on boards by region in 2013 
  0 <10% 10 – 20% 20 – 30% >30% 
            
North America 24.7 11 39.6 18.6 6 
Europe 10.3 6.3 31.4 32.8 19.2 
EMEA 39.6 10.4 29.2 15.1 5.7 
Latam 56 13.1 19 10.7 1.2 
Developed Asia 54 11.1 24.3 8.7 1.9 
Emerging Asia 49.5 17.2 23.3 6.7 3.3 
Total 33.7 11.1 31.4 16.9 6.9 
    Source: Credit Suisse Research 
There is a significant amount of literature about this issue. Some of this suggests 
that corporate boards benefit from greater gender diversity, while others have an opposing 
view.  McKinsey and Catalyst favour the positive effects. Catalyst has shown that Fortune 
500 companies with more women on their boards tend to be more profitable.
7
 McKinsey 
displayed similar results as well: companies with a higher proportion of women at board of 
directors typically show a better degree of organization, above-average operating margins 
and higher valuations.
8
 Other studies, which were conducted by Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
or Rose (2007), have shown that there is no relationship between greater gender diversity 
and improved profitability. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of women’s presence in 
corporate boards on firm performance using evidence from Georgian financial firms over 
10 years period. In addition, it will try to understand what the other gains from are, and 
obstacles for, the participation of female members of board of directors for a company. It 
will add to the scarce empirical evidence that is available about this topic in Georgia. Most 
of the studies are concentrated on the USA, Central and Western Europe or other large 
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countries.  Increased female participation in society and economic activities is one of the 
important subjects that have been discussed in Georgia during recent years. So far, there are 
no gender quota requirements in Georgian corporate boards, however in politics this debate 
has already started and there are talks about introducing gender quotas in parliament. If this 
is introduced in parliament, afterwards there will probably be only a relatively short way 
from politics to economy, regardless of the degree of efficiency of these quotas (Teigen, 
2012). Furthermore, the country is aspiring to integrate into European Union and in the 
near future it may face these requirements. Thus, our study will contribute to future 
discussions about this topic. Finally, it simply will be interesting to investigate this subject 
and to see what is the relationship between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In chapter 2 a literature review 
is conducted. This begins with theoretical perspectives about gender diversity effect of 
boardroom and is followed by the economic aspects of diversity. In the third section of the 
literature review we will present some of arguments against gender diversity and the final 
section contains discussion of results of similar studies. Chapter 3 describes the research 
data and methodology used. This is followed by chapter 4 with a discussion of the results 
obtained while chapter 5
 
provides the main conclusions.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
In most of the literature, board of directors are considered to have several functions 
such as supervising managers, providing with information and advices, monitoring 
compliance with necessary laws and regulations, and connecting the company with the 
external environment (Monks and Minow, 2004). Due to the complexity of the banking 
industry and the fact that it has a crucial role in the functioning of economic systems, 
corporate governance is an important tool for banks to monitor their performance 
continuously. Board diversity is believed to be one of the mechanisms to enhance board 
performance by improving its effectiveness, control and monitoring functions (van der 
Walt and Ingley, 2003). Gender diversity is an especially important issue for policy makers 
around the globe as these are trying to support the development of female talent. For 
example Norway and Spain have already introduced a rule, which requires public 
companies to have at least 40% of women in their boards; France will fully adopt this rule 
by 2017.
9
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives  
 
Arguments for diversity in corporate boards can be derived from several 
backgrounds, which are theoretical, economic and moral (ethical).  In the existing literature, 
the main theoretical perspectives of corporate governance that are most often used to 
explain positive effect of diversity on firm performance are the agency, resource 
dependence and institutional theories.  
Agency theory is more often used by researchers to understand the link between 
boardroom characteristics and firm value. As it is already well known corporate board plays 
a very important role in controlling and monitoring managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It 
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ensures shareholders that managers act in their best interests and create value for them. 
There are different characteristics which help board to execute its functions more 
effectively. One argument  consistent with diversity increasing boardroom strength and 
independence is that people with different gender, cultural and education background might 
raise more questions which might not be asked by the directors with similar backgrounds 
(Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003). However, over monitoring can cause some failures 
in communication between managers and directors. Moreover, the more diverse the 
directors are, the more conflicts can arise on the board because of opinion disagreement 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Thus, agency theory doesn’t give clear guidance to conclude 
that gender diversity has a positive effect on firm performance, thus increasing the 
importance of empirical examination (Carter et al., 2003).  
The Resource dependence theory provides a much stronger support for the financial 
benefits of board diversity. This theory, developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), says that 
firms operate in an open system and depend on external organizations that play an 
important role in the functioning and survival of businesses. The corporate board acts as an 
essential link between the firm and its environment and the external resources it depends 
on. As a result, when there are various types of directors in the corporate board they will 
bring different beneficial resources for the firm due to the unique information they hold. 
Thus, the existence of female directors in the corporate board may help the company to 
enlarge its access to critical resources through their skills, knowledge and experience, 
which are different from their opposite gender (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella, 2007). 
Institutional theory can be another justification for gender diversity of a board of 
directors. Bilimoria (2006) examined the effect of female directors on the gender 
composition of a company and found out that they have a positive effect on promoting 
female workers on other corporate levels. As a result, the presence of women on the board 
can be a positive sign that a firm values the success of its female personnel. This can 
improve the reputation of a company in the eyes of future recruiters and customers as well 
(Hillman et al., 2007; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). 
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2.2 Economic arguments for gender diversity 
 
There are several economic arguments for greater gender diversity. The first is that 
boardroom diversity can increase the competitive advantage of diversified firms compared 
to non-diversified ones (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). This argument is based on 
empirical works developed by Robinson and Dechant (1997). In addition, markets are 
becoming more and more diverse and a similarly diversified board can have a better 
understanding of what customers and suppliers need. As a result, the firm can enjoy 
benefits from higher market penetration. Furthermore, based on their personal experience 
female directors may suggest new ways of introducing products to the market. Having 
women on their boardrooms can be especially critical for firms which operate in markets 
with high concentration of female buyers (Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 1999). 
The second argument is that diversity increases creativity and innovation in the 
company. Like attitudes, beliefs and other characteristics are not randomly distributed in 
the population, but they tend to vary systematically by demographic variables such as 
gender, age or race (Robinson and Dechant, 1997). The third argument is effective decision 
making. Different ranges of experience and opinions can lead to better corporate 
governance (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000) and female directors are one of the sources who 
bring a different voice into the debates and decision making of the board (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2004). 
Board meetings serve an important monitoring function (Vafeas, 1999). Carter 
(2003) finds evidence that firms that have more women on the board tend to have more 
board meetings in a year. Moreover, Singh (2008), who examined gendered boardroom 
culture in engineering, high technology and scientific organizations, reports that diversity 
leads to more effective and less macho working environment. He adds that homogeneous 
groups like all male or all female groups don’t understand what they are missing and have a 
narrower view. One of the interviewed male executive director’s comments was that “they 
bring a different way of working, you know, a different perspective, a different way of 
resolving issues and conflict and that helps the dynamics greatly”. 
10 
 
In fact, the number of women on the board can make a difference.  Konrad et al. 
(2006) reports, based on interviews with several CEOs and directors from Fortune 1000 
companies, that when there are 3 or more female representatives on the board women are 
no longer considered outsiders and they influence the content and process of board 
discussions extensively. “One woman is the invisibility phase; two women is the 
conspiracy phase; three women is mainstream”. This supports the critical mass theory, 
which says that when a certain limit is reached the impact of subgroup gets more obvious 
and significant (Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, and Hooper, 2006). 
 
2.3 Arguments against gender diversity 
 
On the other hand, there are some arguments that high gender diversity may not be 
the guarantee for a firm to perform better and function effectively. A different perspective 
coming from more diverse boards does not necessarily mean more effective monitoring 
because there is simply a risk that board members may be marginalized (Carter et al., 
2003).   
More diverse board may have a negative influence on effective problem solving. 
The argument is that the decision-making process may take longer, as there may arise 
various and conflicting opinions on a given subject in the boardroom. Thus, the board 
would be more divided and less coordinated than less heterogeneous board would be (Rose, 
2007). Moreover, heterogeneous groups may result in emotional conflicts which may 
possibly make fulfillment of particular tasks more difficult (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). 
Thus, ignoring these negative effects of diversity is not the right decision. Instead, 
understanding those negative effects can lead to better results.  
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2.4 Discussion of related studies 
 
The arguments discussed above do not give a clear conclusion on the effect of 
boardroom diversity on company performance.  As a result, a lot of empirical examination 
has been conducted all over the world to understand the relationship in the real world. Most 
empirical results are based on USA data but in recent years studies developed for European 
countries increased significantly. All these studies do not have consistent results. They 
show both positive and negative relationships or in some case no relationship at all between 
board diversity and firm performance. One of the reasons for the conflicting results is that 
studies are conducted in different countries and different moments in time. This can be an 
important aspect because timing and the legal and institutional systems of the country may 
have a serious influence on the results (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  
One of the earliest studies, developed by Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997), finds a 
disproportional relationship between the percentage of women in the top management team 
or in the board of directors and firm financial performance (using only accounting measures 
such as ROE, ROA). On the other hand, Carter (2003) examined the impact gender and 
minority diversity on the company financial performance. They used a 638-firm full data 
sample from Fortune 1000 firms and after controlling for industry, size and other important 
variables, they found a significant positive relationship between the presence of women or 
minorities on the board and firm value. In this case instead of an accounting variable they 
used Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value creation. This is one of the first and 
comprehensive studies which examine boardroom diversity effect.  
There are more recent non-USA studies too. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) 
investigated the link between gender diversity of the board as measured by several 
variables and firm financial performance as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. On the 
example of Spain they used panel data methodology and found that gender diversity has a 
positive effect on firm value.  At the same time on a Danish firms’ sample the study fails to 
find a significant relationship between the same variables (Rose, 2007). However, in 
contrast to those findings Ahern and Dittmar (2012) examined the impact on firm valuation 
12 
 
of mandated female board representation according using the Norwegian firms’ example. 
They found that there is a substantial decrease in firm value after adopting gender quotas in 
corporate boards since 2003. Their result was consistent with the results of an earlier study 
on the same market by Bohren and Strom (2005). 
Another study developed using 12 years of data (1999-2011) of a developing 
country such as China, supports the idea that gender diversity has, in contrast, a positive 
effect on firm performance as measured by the return on assets and return on sales. Their 
empirical study also supports the critical mass theory (Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014). Contrarily, 
a study on another developing country shows that female board of directors lead to lower 
firm value, using evidence of Pakistani banks (Sajjad and Rashid, 2015).  
Most of the studies exclude financial firms from their samples, and as a result the 
empirical literature is much more limited for the understanding of boardroom gender 
diversity in the banking sector, besides the fact that corporate boards play a core role for the 
successful operation of banks (Adams and Mehran, 2008). Some authors even say that 
board failure in corporate boards is a major cause of the financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
Using 34 years of data, Adams and Mehran (2008) document that board composition has 
little relationship with performance in the USA financial sector, which is consistent with 
some other studies for non-financial firms. However, board size and performance are 
positively related. 
 
 
Table 2 - Summary of related studies 
 
Authors 
 
Year 
 
Subject 
 
Sample 
 
Methods 
Control 
variables 
 
Results 
 
 
Shrader 
et al. 
 
 
1997 
To explore the 
firm-level 
relationships of 
women in 
management 
with financial 
200 USA 
firms with 
the largest 
market 
value for 
1992 and 
Performance 
measures: 
ROS, ROA, 
ROI, ROE. 
Statistical 
tests used: 
-total number of 
managers 
-total number of 
top managers 
-total number of 
board members  
Mixed 
relations 
among 
measures of 
women in 
management 
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performance 
outcomes  
1993 Hierarchical 
regression F-
test 
and firm 
financial 
performance 
 
 
 
David 
A.Carter 
Betty J. 
Simkins 
W. Gary 
Simpson 
 
 
 
 
2003 
Relationship 
between board 
diversity 
(gender and 
minorities) and 
firm value  
638 firms 
from 
Fortune 
1000 
Firms 
(USA)for 
one year 
(1997) 
Performance 
measure: 
Tobin’s Q. 
Statistical 
tests: 
Comparisons 
of means and 
2SLS 
regression 
analysis. 
 
-board size 
-number of 
meetings 
annually  
-CEO/ chair 
duality 
-weather 
directors receive 
stock 
compensation  
-insider 
ownership 
-% of insiders on 
the board 
-firm size 
-ROA 
-Industry  
Statistically 
significant 
positive 
relationship 
between the 
presence of 
women or 
minorities on 
the board and 
firm value. 
Fraction of 
women and 
minority 
directors are 
depend on firm 
size and 
number of 
insiders 
 
 
Kevin 
Campbell
, 
Antonio 
Minguez-
Vera 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
To investigate 
link between 
the gender 
diversity of the 
board and firm 
financial 
performance in 
Spain 
Panel data 
of non-
financial 
firms 
listed on 
the 
continuou
s market 
in Madrid 
during 
1995-2000 
Measure of 
firm value: 
Tobin’s Q. 
Statistical 
tests: 
Hausman test, 
2SLS 
-Total number of 
directors 
-Debt level 
-ROA 
-Size of the firm 
 
Presence of 
women on the 
board of 
directors does 
not, in itself, 
effect firm 
value. 
However, 
diversity of the 
board has 
positive impact 
on firm value. 
Firm value has 
no influence on 
women’s 
presence and 
on gender 
diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The key issue 
is whether 
board 
443 firms 
listed on  
Copenhag
Measure of 
firm’s 
performance: 
- The average 
payments to the 
board 
Evidence 
showing that 
gender in 
14 
 
 
 
 
Caspar 
Rose  
 
 
 
 
2007 
diversity, 
especially in 
relation to 
gender or 
ethnic 
background, 
education, 
proportion of 
foreigners 
etc.  could 
stimulate 
firm’s 
performance. 
en Stock 
Exchange 
during 
1998-2001 
Tobin’s Q, 
Statistical 
method: 
cross-section 
regression 
 
-the increase of 
book assets over 
the period 
-Cumulated 
ownership of all 
shareholders 
with more than 
5% ownership 
-firm size   
-industry 
dummies 
-year dummies  
 
relation to 
board 
composition 
does not 
influence firm 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Yo Liu, 
Zuobao 
Wei, 
Feixue 
Xie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
The effect of 
board gender 
diversity on 
firm 
performance in 
China’s listed 
firms, 
moreover they 
also examined 
if number of 
women make 
difference and 
where is the 
strong effect of 
gender 
diversity in 
state or private 
owned firms 
Over 2000 
listed 
firms in 
Shanghai 
and 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchanges 
for period 
1999-2011 
Firm 
performance 
is measured 
by ROS, 
ROA. 
Statistical 
tests used 
lagged board 
variable 
method, 
2SLS, 
Arellano-
Bond method 
 
-Percent of 
independent 
board directors 
-board size 
-ownership 
domestic or 
foreign 
-percent of 
shares owned by 
firm 
management 
-number of share 
holders 
-leverage 
-number of years 
firm is listed  
-Percent of 
women 
directors has 
significant and 
positive effect 
on firm’s 
performance 
-3 or more 
women have 
stronger effect 
of firm 
performance 
-Effect is 
significant in 
legal person 
owned firms 
and 
insignificant in 
firms 
controlled by 
state owner 
 
 
 
 
Sumbal 
Sajjad 
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It can be seen that even empirical data does not give clear predictions of the effect 
of women’s presence on corporate boards.  As there is no reported evidence about the 
Georgian reality this study will be interesting in order to understand what the situation 
looks like, because diversity is one important element of a corporate board. Little attention 
is paid to this issue in developing Eastern European countries such as Georgia, whereas its 
importance is increasing day by day around the globe. Thus, this study will also have a 
small contribution for the existing literature, as there is a lack of empirical evidence from 
developed Eastern European countries. 
In summary, a set of theories and empirical evidence provided above provide a 
reasonable indication for the possibility that a link between board diversity and firm 
performance exists. However, it is not possible to say the nature of the link, i.e., whether it 
is positive or negative. As a result, our stated null hypothesis will be following: 
H1: The presence of women on the board is not related to the financial performance 
of the firm.  
Rejection of this hypothesis will imply that the presence of women directors in the 
board has an effect on firm financial performance. Moreover, it will be also tested if the 
number of women directors makes difference. 
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3. Research Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Sample and data analysis  
 
As it was mentioned before, this study uses data from the Georgian market. The 
sample consists of Georgian commercial banks which have dominated position in domestic 
financial sector. According to data from the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) there are 19 
banks which operate actively there and 3 more banks which do not operate under their 
name any more due to acquisitions or because they left the country already.  Their financial 
data is obtained from annual financial reports and BankScope database. Corporate board 
sizes and their gender composition are taken from the annual reports, published on the 
website of NBG. All the banks are required to publish audited and detailed annual reports 
by NBG in order to maintain financial stability and transparency in the country.  As a 
result, this study will use panel data with 174 observations for 10 years from 2005 until 
2014. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model. The 
main dependent variable is ROA which is used as the measure of performance of the bank 
and has a mean value of 0.48% which is close to the results obtained by Liu et al. (2013) 
for the Chinese banking sector. This percentage also shows that firms in the banking sector 
were financially successful throughout the 10-year period investigated; however there is a 
wide variation. The minimum value of ROA is -22.36% and the maximum 14.07%, while 
the mean value is 0.48%. The same situation is for ROE in this case variation is much more 
significant, the mean value is 2.98%, while -121.54% and 47.18% are the minimum and the 
maximum values, respectively.  
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
Total assets, equity and net income are in thousands of Georgian Lari (GEL), LN means natural logarithm, 
ROA (net income divided by total assets), ROE (net income divided by total equity), Lever (total debt divided 
by total equity), Foreign share ownership (percentage of foreign investor’s share ownership), Dummy Woman 
(binary variable that takes value of one when there is at least one woman on the board of directors and 0 
otherwise), Blau’s and Shannon index measure diversity. 
 
The mean percentage of women in Georgian banks’ corporate boards is 13.41% for 
the period used in the study.  It is possible to take a look at the percentage changes over the 
past ten years from figure 2. It shows that the highest percentages (exceeding 17%) of 
board positions held by women were in 2012 and in 2013, while for 2014 it is a bit less, 
around 15%. However, in comparison to the situation in 2006 the progress is noticeable as 
the percentage almost doubled. An Egon Zehnder study about European Board Diversity 
 
Mean Median St. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total Assets 626,966 204,306 1,193,053 4,715 7,537,300 
LN Assets 12.20 12.23 1.58 8.46 15.84 
Equity 114,670 38,495 219,398 852 1,461,100 
Lever 71.88 80.84 21.15 4.44 97.91 
ROA (%) 0.48 1.82 5.19 -22.36 14.07 
ROE (%) 2.98 6.01 22.35 -121.54 47.18 
Net Income 10,467 1,612 38,402 -98,900 246,000 
Board size 5 5 2 2 9 
LN Board 1.47 1.61 0.38 0.69 2.20 
Number of women 
directors 
1 0 1 0 3 
% of women  13.41% 0.00% 18.13% 0.00% 66.67% 
Dummy Woman 0.43 0 0.50 0 1.00 
Age of the bank 12 13 6 1 25 
LN Age 2.32 2.52 0.68 0 3.22 
Foreign share 
ownership 71.36% 92.16% 36.76% 0.00% 100.00% 
Blau's Index 0.17 0 0.20 0 0.50 
Shanon index 0.25 0 0.29 0 0.69 
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Analysis is used to compare this with the situation for European boards.10 According to that 
study the European average is 20.3% for the year 2014 and Georgia has a better situation 
than Austria, Greece of Portugal, but its situation is worse than the UK, Sweden or Norway. 
The situation is however way better than some other Eastern European countries. For 
example, according to the same study the Czech Republic has only 3.8% of board positions 
held by women in 2014. Moreover, the figures are 9.3% for Hungary and 5.9% for Russia. 
Finally, the means for the bank size (LN total assets), leverage variable (Lever), 
board size and bank age variables are, 12.20, 71.88, 5 and 12 respectively. While for the 
instrumental variable foreign share ownership the mean is 71.36%. 
 
Figure 2 - Average percentage of women in the boards of Georgian banks 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 http://www.egonzehnder.com/files/2014_egon_zehnder_european_board_diversity_analysis.pdf 
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Table 4 - European board gender diversity by country in 2014 
Country Company 
% Board positions 
held by women 
Austria  6  10.7%  
Belgium  8  20.2%  
Denmark  8  20.2%  
Finland  6  32.1%  
France  58  28.5%  
Germany  44  16.6%  
Greece  6  9.9%  
Italy  19  20.2%  
Luxembourg  7  8.9%  
Netherlands  22  19.5%  
Norway  7  38.9%  
Portugal  6  5.2%  
Republic of Ireland  14  16.3%  
Spain  20  15.5%  
Sweden  21  27.5%  
Switzerland  34  13.9%  
United Kingdom  70  22.6%  
Europe Overall  356  20.3%  
   Egon Zehnder 2014 
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Table 5 - The number and % of women on the boards of directors of Georgian banks 
Number of women on 
board 
0 1 2 3 Total 
Number of firm/year 
observations 
101 50 23 2 176 
% of firm/year 
observations 
57.39% 28.41% 13.07% 1.14% 100% 
 
Table 5 provides detailed breakdown of women directors for the banking sector in 
Georgia over the period in our sample. As can be seen for the 10-year period more than half 
(57.39%) of the year/bank observations don’t have a single woman on their boards of 
directors. Further, among 176 observations, 28.41% have only one woman and 14.21% 2 or 
more. The maximum number of women on the corporate board of Georgian banks is 3.  
 
3.2 Empirical methodology  
 
To determine the nature of the relationship between firm performance and female 
representation on the board a regression analysis is used. A measure of firm performance is 
regressed against a proxy for corporate board gender diversity according the following 
model: 
                                ∑             (3.1) 
In the above model firm performance is measured by ROA; diversity is measured 
by the percentage of women in the board, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when 
there are one or more women in the board, 0 otherwise. Diversity is also measured by the 
Blau and Shannon indices of diversity; CV stands for a number of control variables which 
in this case are leverage, bank size (natural logarithm of total assets), board size (natural 
logarithm of number of directors) and bank age (natural logarithm of bank age). 
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As it is mentioned above an accounting-based measurements, return on assets 
(ROA), is used as the main indicator of firm performance. Most related studies use two 
methodologies to measure firm financial performance. The first is accounting- based 
measurements and the second is market-based measurements such as Tobin’s q.   Even 
though Tobin’s q is a widely used proxy to measure firm financial performance and it 
taking into account market expectations it is also not directly affected by the tax laws or 
accounting conventions (Wernerfelt et al.1988).  In our case it won’t be possible to use it 
due to the fact that most of the Georgian banks are not listed. Instead, our study follows 
Shrader et al. (1997) and Adams and Ferreira (2009), which use of returns on total assets 
(ROA) and other accounting indicators of firm performance. ROA indicates the ability of 
the company to produce accounting income for its shareholders within a given portfolio of 
assets for a particular time period.  
As a proxy of gender diversity the total percentage of women in board and dummy 
variable is used similar to other studies. Moreover, according to Campbell and Vera (2007) 
two other indexes are used to measure diversity. The first is the Blau index which comes 
from 1977 but it is also known as Hirshman’s index (1964) when it is used as the 
measurement of industrial concentrations. It is measured as   ∑   
  
   , where 
   represents the percentage of board members in each category and k is the total number of 
board members. The value of the index can vary from 0 to 0.5, which means there is only 
one category in case of 0 and board has an equal number of both gender representatives in 
the case of 0.5. The second index is the Shannon index which is sometimes known as 
Shannon-Wiener index due to the fact that it was independently developed by Wiener 
(1961) too. The calculation is according to the following equation  ∑    
 
        , where 
   and k have the same meanings as in the previous equation. The range of values is from 0 
to 0.69 and the logic is similar. However, the Shannon index is more sensitive to smaller 
differences in gender composition of boards, since it is a logarithmic measure of diversity.  
To understand if unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the independent 
variables or not, a Hausman test will be used. This test estimates weather coefficients of the 
fixed effects estimations and the random effects estimation are equal. If the hypothesis is 
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rejected the coefficients will be different which means that only fixed effects will be 
consistent. Furthermore, two-stage least squares (2SLS) will be used to avoid possible 
endogeneity problem. The problem arises because the presence of women could lead to a 
high performance of the firm or, the other way around, firms with high performance could 
be more willing to have more women in their boards. This means that board gender 
diversity could be correlated with the error terms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). As a result, 
using a two-stage method will give unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates. Similar 
combination of control variables will be used as well which are discussed below. 
To avoid biased results different control variables are used, which have some effect 
on board structure and bank performance already found in related studies.  
One of the control variables is the natural log of board size which represents the 
total number of directors. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) in their studies 
criticized the performance of large boards. The main arguments were that large boards face 
the problems of poor communication and decision-making that decreases their 
effectiveness. A negative effect was also found by David Yermack (1996). He used a 
different regression model with data from 1984-91 for 452 large public corporations and 
found an inverse association between board size and firm value. He also showed that 
financial ratios, measuring profitability and operating efficiency, appear to decrease as 
board size expands. For European countries similar results were found, consistent with the 
benefits of increased monitoring from bigger boards being outweighed by problems related 
with informational asymmetries between the CEO and the board, communication issues 
and decision-making difficulties (Martin J. Conyon and Simon I. Peck, 1998). However, 
contrary to theories predicting that smaller boards of directors are more effective, Belkhir 
(2009) suggests that banks with larger boards seem to achieve higher market value, as well 
as adding more directors to the board increases the return on assets of a bank. He used 
regression models with data from 1995-2002 for 174 bank and savings-and-loan holding 
companies and found no evidence of a negative relationship between board size and 
performance. The results even push towards a conclusion supporting a positive relationship. 
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Dalton et al. (1999) explains this fact by the argument that large boards increase the pool of 
expertise and access to external resources for a company.  
In addition, bigger boards are more likely to have more female representatives. 
Brammer et al. (2007) conducted a study for the UK market and find that bigger boards 
with larger numbers of non-executive directorships were more diverse, which is consistent 
with findings in earlier literature such as by Carter  et al. (2003). 
Another control variable which is used for this study is bank size, represented by the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The size of a firm can affect performance in different 
ways.  Larger firms can enjoy diverse capabilities and ability to achieve economies of scale 
which allow larger firms to perform better than smaller ones (Penrose, 1959). Moreover, 
Lee (2009) examined more than 7,000 US publicly‐held firms observed over a recent 
period between 1987 and 2006 and found that larger firms tend to be more profitable than 
their smaller counterparts, either due to efficiency gains or higher market power. In the case 
of banks, De Andres and Vallelado (2008) suggest that growth potential is the main 
element in determining profitability rather than lower costs or strong market power. 
The third control variable is the debt ratio, which is calculated as total debt divided 
by total assets. Some researchers assume that if a bank operates in a risky environment or if 
it bears more risk due to its capital policy, there can be a low presence of women in boards 
because of women’s known risk aversion characteristic. They are less trusted to make 
riskier decisions than man that can be nonetheless an important source for the success of 
bank (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; De Cabo et al. 2012). 
Bank age is used as another control variable. A number of researchers suggest that 
older firms are more experienced, enjoy the benefits of learning and thus are already 
expertized in the business (Stinchcombe, 1965). Hence as a result these firms enjoy a 
superior performance. On the other hand, another stream of research suggests that older 
firms are more inertial, and with age they could be getting less flexible to make fast 
adjustments to a changing environment being therefore more likely to lose out in the 
performance to much younger firms (Marshall, 1920). Moreover, Loderer and Waelchli 
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(2009), in their large-scale study to address the issue of corporate aging, suggest that, with 
aging, firm’s COGS and overhead expenses go up, growth slows down, and R&D expenses 
and capital expenditures fall behind the industry median.  
Foreign share ownership was also introduced as an instrumental variable for the 
reason that 2SLS regression model requires one more variable of this kind. The intuition is 
that foreign shareholders could demand more women on the board to follow internationally 
recognized norms. Bianco et al. (2011) in their research found the evidence that women 
were more common in firms owned by a foreign shareholder. 
 
3.3 Correlation among variables 
 
Table 6 shows a simple check for multicollinearity, the purpose of which is to 
understand if independent variables used in the regression are highly correlated. A usual 
rule of thumb is the following: if a correlation between two independent variables is 0.7 or 
more it may indicate multicollinearity. The results presented in table 6 shows that the 
highest correlation coefficients are (in bold) those (a) the percentage of women on the 
board and either the woman dummy variable, the Shannon index and the Blau’s index and 
(b) between the woman dummy and both the Shannon and Blau indexes. Since these 4 
variables are not used simultaneously but only alternatively in each regression model, the 
high correlation among them is not an issue. No other correlation coefficient has a value 
greater than 0.7 in absolute terms.  
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Table 6 - Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROA  1.00                    
2 % of WOMEN  0.16   1.00                  
3 DUMMY WOMAN  0.18   0.86   1.00                
4 BLAU’S INDEX  0.17   0.94   0.96   1.00              
5 SHANON INDEX  0.17   0.93   0.98   1.00   1.00            
6 LEVER  0.16   0.16   0.27   0.26   0.26   1.00          
7 LNAGE  0.24   0.24   0.26   0.25   0.25   0.47   1.00        
8 LNASSETS  0.19   0.19   0.28   0.22   0.24   0.62   0.58   1.00      
9 LNBOARD  0.12  -0.12   0.05  -0.04  -0.02  -0.00   0.17   0.18   1.00    
10 
 
FORAGNE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP -0.00  -0.17  -0.08  -0.12  -0.11  -0.02  -0.15   0.02   0.35   1.00  
The table shows the correlation matrix between all the independent variables used in the study. 
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4. Results 
 
In this chapter the empirical results of our investigation are presented concerning 
the relationship between gender diversity of corporate boards of Georgian banks and their 
performance, and according to the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. 
The results of the testing of the regression models with different diversity 
characteristics are presented in tables 7, 8, 9 and 10. The relationship between the 
percentage of women on the board and ROA is shown in table 7, while table 8 displays the 
effect of gender diversity on firm performance when gender diversity is defined as a 
situation where there is at least one woman on the board of directors. Finally, the results 
when either the Shannon index or the Blau Indexes are used as proxies for board gender 
diversity are presented in tables 9 and 10. After performing Hausman tests the results 
showed that unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the independent variables and 
that coefficients with fixed affects and random effects are different, thus only fixed effects 
were used for estimating coefficients in all of the models. Furthermore, all the results take 
into account possible endogeneity issues by using a 2SLS estimation procedure.  
All the models, with different measures of gender diversity in corporate boards, 
show that there is a negative and significant impact of gender diversity on the performance 
of banks in Georgia. Overall, it can be said that all the positive aspects of gender diversity 
are outweighed by the negative sides. These results may be explained by the fact that 
women are still under-represented in high corporate positions at Georgian banks and thus 
have a position that can be seen as that of outsiders, and as a result their impact is still not 
positive. In the majority of the cases boards only have one woman among five to seven 
members, which means they have the status of a minority presence and thus in most of the 
cases a critical mass is not reached in females. This fact could lead to tokenism as 
explained by Kanter (1977). When there is less than 15% of representatives of one 
particular community in society they are seen as tokens - just representatives of a category 
rather than being there as an individual. As a result, tokens are assumed to have very little 
impact over the group or its culture (Jackson et al, 1995). In addition, another possible 
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explanation could be the existence of a glass ceiling. This argues that women can be 
promoted until only up to some point after which it’s hard for them to move on as they face 
twice more barriers than man at the same level (Akpinar-Sposito, 2013). Lastly, a negative 
impact of women on firm performance could be caused simply due to lack of training and 
experience of female representatives throughout their career path. The financial sector is 
very specific and complex in comparison to other more female-oriented sectors and it 
demands a continuous self-development which sometimes is not possible for women due to 
the maternity leave and other household problems. 
With respect to women’s role on boards, the results are similar to those obtained by 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Sajjad and Rashid (2015) and Shrader et al. (1997). Their 
evidence suggests that female members of board of directors negatively impact on firm 
value. Even though Shrader et al (1997) didn’t use only the banking industry the results are 
similar. Ahern and Dittmar (2012)  examined the effect of introducing gender quotas in 
Norway after 2003 and found that the quota system led to a substantial decline in Tobin’s 
Q. Sajjad and Rashid (2015) used the banking sector in Pakistan for their study and found 
evidence that a higher proportion of female and young board of directors leads to lower 
firm value. 
Regarding control variables it can be noticed that bank age has a positive and 
significant impact performance. Hence, the evidence supports the idea that older firms 
enjoy better performance (Stinchcombe, 1965; Marshall, 1920). Moreover, leverage has a 
negative effect on ROA in all the models, a similar impact to that of board size in all three 
models except the second one when a dummy variable is used  as a  mesure of gender 
diversity. Finally, bank size, which is defined as the logarithm of total assets, has a positive 
impact on the performance of banks, a result is in accordance with the empirical evidence 
from Lee (2009) but which in our results is not statistically significant. 
 
 
28 
 
Table 7 – 2SLS panel data regression of bank performance according to the 
percentage of women used as the main measure of diversity  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
Sample: 2005-2014 
Periods included: 10 
Number of the firms: 22 
Total panel observations: 176 
Instrument specification: C LEVER LNAGE LNASSETS LNBOARD FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
      
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
      
C -27.10033 0.1389 
% OF WOMEN -74.83829 ⃰   0.0703 
LEVER -0.166174 0.1701 
LNAGE 8.013611 ⃰ 0.0952 
LNASSETS 2.912741 0.1477 
LNBOARD -3.033334 0.3815 
Notes: *  Significance at the 10% level, **  Significance at the 5% level, ***  Significance at the 1% level. 
Variables: ROA (return on assets, approximation of bank performance), % OF WOMEN (percentage of 
women on the board of directors), LEVER (total debt over total assets), LNAGE (natural logarithm of bank 
age), LNASSETS (natural logarithm of total assets of bank), LNBOARD (natural logarithm of board size), 
FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP (percentage of foreign investor’s share ownership). 
 
Table 8 – 2SLS panel data regression of bank performance according to binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 when there is at least one woman on the corporate 
board and 0 otherwise  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
Sample: 2005-2014 
Periods included: 10 
Number of the firms: 22 
Total panel observations: 176 
Instrument specification: C LEVER LN_AGE LNASSETS LNBOARD FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
      
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
      
Constant -56.6618 ⃰  ⃰  0.0395 
DUMMY WOMAN -34.4423 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0243 
LEVER -0.11596 0.3678 
LNAGE 8.890707 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0458 
LNASSETS 4.783936 0.12 
LNBOARD 0.871582 0.789 
Notes: *  Significance at the 10% level, **  Significance at the 5% level, ***  Significance at the 1% level. 
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Variables: ROA (return on assets, approximation of bank performance), DUMMY WOMAN (binary variable 
that takes value of 1 when there is at least on women one board of directors and 0 otherwise), LEVER (total 
debt over total assets), LNAGE (natural logarithm of bank age), LNASSETS (natural logarithm of total assets 
of bank), LNBOARD (natural logarithm of board size), FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP (percentage of 
foreign investor’s share ownership). 
 
Table 9 – 2SLS panel data regression of bank performance according to Blau’s index 
used as the main measure of diversity  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
Sample: 2005-2014 
Periods included: 10 
Number of the firms: 22 
Total panel observations: 176 
Instrument specification: C LEVER LN_AGE LNASSETS LNBOARD FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
      
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
      
Constant -57.8748 ⃰ 0.0673 
BLAU’S INDEX -109.421 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0202 
LEVER -0.1389 0.3689 
LNAGE 13.3135 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0248 
LNASSETS 4.888319 0.1949 
LNBOARD -2.52949 0.5254 
Notes: *  Significance at the 10% level, **  Significance at the 5% level, ***  Significance at the 1% level 
Variables: ROA (return on assets, approximation of bank performance), BLAU’S INDEX (Blau index of 
diversity), LEVER (total debt over total assets), LNAGE (natural logarithm of bank age), LNASSETS 
(natural logarithm of total assets of bank), LNBOARD (natural logarithm of board size), 
FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP (percentage of foreign investor’s share ownership). 
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Table 10 – 2SLS panel data regression of bank performance according to Shennon 
index used as the main measure of diversity  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
Sample: 2005-2014 
Periods included: 10 
Number of the firms: 22 
Total panel observations: 176 
Instrument specification: C LEVER LN_AGE LNASSETS LNBOARD FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
      
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
      
C -56.46756 ⃰   0.0573 
SHANNON INDEX -69.5113 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0196 
LEVER -0.130947 0.3677 
LNAGE 11.96015 ⃰  ⃰ 0.0261 
LNASSETS 4.777932 0.1747 
LNBOARD -1.634265 0.6639 
Notes:*  Significance at the 10% level, **  Significance at the 5% level, ***  Significance at the 1% level 
Variables: ROA (return on assets, approximation of bank performance), SHANNON INDEX (Shannon index 
of diversity), LEVER (total debt over total assets), LNAGE (natural logarithm of bank age), LNASSETS 
(natural logarithm of total assets of bank), LNBOARD (natural logarithm of board size), 
FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP (percentage of foreign investor’s share ownership). 
 
As mentioned in literature review number of women on board could make 
difference. For robustness check we ran another regression with the second dummy 
variable, which tests if presence of two and more women has the same impact on firm 
performance as a single woman. The results presented in table 11 shows that the number of 
women directors matter. In this case results are different from earlier observations. Two 
and more women on corporate board have positive and significant effect on the 
performance of Georgian banks. The results obtained support to critical mass theory and 
shows that when women don’t have the status of a minority presence boardroom is more 
diverse and it can lead to better performance for firm. 
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Table 11 – 2SLS panel data regression of bank performance according to binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 when there are two or more women on the corporate 
board and 0 otherwise 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
Sample: 2005 2014 
Periods included: 10 
Number of the firms: 22 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 176 
Instrument specification: C LEVER LN_AGE LNASSETS LNBOARD   
FORAGNE_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
      
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
      
C 34.2456 0.2241 
DUMMY WOMAN2 31.78646 ⃰ 0.0677 
LEVER 0.122864 0.221 
LNAGE -3.951875 0.2809 
LNASSETS -1.639814 0.4746 
LNBOARD -12.22965 ⃰ 0.0828 
Notes: *  Significance at the 10% level, **  Significance at the 5% level, ***  Significance at the 1% level. 
Variables: ROA (return on assets, approximation of bank performance), DUMMY WOMAN2 (binary 
variable that takes value of 1 when there are two and more women on board of directors and 0 otherwise), 
LEVER (total debt over total assets), LNAGE (natural logarithm of bank age), LNASSETS (natural logarithm 
of total assets of bank), LNBOARD (natural logarithm of board size), FOREIGN_SHARE_OWNERSHIP 
(percentage of foreign investor’s share ownership). 
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5. Conclusions  
 
This study started by analysing the existing literature on board diversity and then 
provided, to our knowledge, the first empirical evidence on the relationship between board 
gender diversity and company performance in the Georgian banking sector. In particular, it 
provides new insights about the Georgian reality by using a 10-year period sample from 
2005 until 2015.  Our research uses different proxies of gender diversity such as the 
percentage of women in the board, a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when there 
is at least one woman on the board and 0 otherwise, and two additional indexes of diversity 
– Blau and Shannon’s indexes. By using panel data methodology and controlling for 
endogeneity the results show that corporate board gender diversity has a negative and 
significant impact on the accounting performance of banks measured by return on assets. 
However, if critical mass is reached gender diversity impact becomes positive and 
significant. This study will contribute to the scarce empirical evidence in the region and 
should encourage further discussion inside the country.  
Overall, results show that there is still much that needs to be done towards the goal of 
gender equality in Georgian corporate boards. Their role needs to be empowered in society 
and top management positions as well by overcoming glass ceiling phenomenon and 
changing their status from being tokens into the real decision maker to becoming 
influencers and shapers. 
One of the limitations of the study is that it covers only the banking sector in Georgia If 
other sectors are added, the observed results on board diversity and firm performance may 
vary. Moreover, it could be interesting to incorporate other control variables which at this 
time were not available due to the lack of corporate information. For future research it 
would also be interesting to investigate this topic for a larger regional scale and comparing 
countries in the Caucasus region in terms of the characteristics of gender diversity in 
corporate boards and its impact. 
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